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Abstract: The history of the involvement of NU in politics 
cannot be separated from the elites of this organization in 
East Java. The variety of cultures that flourishes in the 
province strongly influences the nature and characteristics 
of the NU elites. This paper is an attempt to deal with the 
relationship between those subcultures and political 
participation. It focuses only on five subcultures, 
Mataraman, coastal areas, Arek, Madurese, and Pendalungan. 
The NU kiais are perceived by their followers to have 
played double roles as religious leaders (dealing with 
spiritual aspects) and community leaders (relating to socio-
political aspects). Locality and its growing culture become a 
key factor. Locality makes a contribution to the growth of 
understanding about politics. Mataraman NU elites always 
keep their relationship with formal religious issues, and 
there is a tendency among them to separate religion from 
politics. In contrast, Madura, Pendalungan, Pesisiran (north 
coast), and Arek areas tend to combine religion and 
politics. 
Keywords: East Java NU, Hybridization, Amalgamation, 
political participation, Aswaja. 
Introduction 
Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU, The Awakening of Muslim Scholars), is the 
largest religious organization in Indonesia. There are no definite 
statistics on the number of NU members, but based on a survey 
conducted in 1994, the number of NU members is estimated to exceed 
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35 million.1 Another survey conducted by the Lembaga Survei 
Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute) in 2004, indicated that the 
number of NU members may be as high as 60 million. 2 
NU was established in Surabaya in 1926 by several prominent 
`ulama>’ (Muslim scholars, Indonesian “kyai”) and traders. It was born 
in an atmosphere of adversity, mentally and economically, either 
because of Dutch colonialism or the confines of tradition. Downturns 
experienced by the Indonesian people inspired educated figures to 
fight for their dignity through education and organization. 
The history of the involvement of NU in politics cannot be 
separated from the elites of this organization in East Java, the province 
in Indonesia with the largest number of Islamic boarding schools. 
Consequently, the NU Party, and parties having a close relationship 
with NU, received a considerable number of votes in the 1955,3 1971, 
1999 and 2004 general elections in East Java.  
East Java  is the most populous province in Indonesia.4 In terms of 
culture, it can be divided into several subcultures. According to Ayu 
Sutarto,5 viewed from its cultural heritage, there are at least ten 
subcultures that flourish in East Java. These Subcultures include 
Mataraman, Ponoragan, Samin, Tengger, coastal areas, Arek, Madurese, 
Pendalungan, and Osing. All of these subcultures have different language 
characteristics but some of them have a common history.  
The variety of cultures that flourishes in East Java strongly 
influences the nature and characteristics of the NU elites since they 
                                                 
1 Greg Fealy and Greg Barton, Tradisionalisme Radikal; Persinggungan Nahdlatul Ulama’ 
dan Negara, transl. by Ahmad Suaedy, et al (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1997), p. xiii.  
2 Masyhudi Muchtar and Mohammad Subhan, Profil NU Jawa Timur (Surabaya: LTNU, 
2007), p. 12. 
3 For example, the general election 1955, NU in East Java gained 3.206. 392 from total 
votes of 6.989.333. Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama; Sejarah NU 1952-1967, transl. by 
Farid Wajidi and M.A. Bakhtiar (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007), p. 221. 
4 The population of East Java is 35,148,579 inhabitants, with male population: 
17,249,198, female; 17,899,381, while the total area is 157,130, 15 km2. In terms of 
religion, Islam, 96, 3% Christian, 1.6%; Catholic, 1%, Buddhist, and Hindu 0.4%, 0, 
6%. See www.depdagri.go.id. (Accessed on 22 February 2009). From the government side, 
East Java is divided into 29 districts and 9 Cities, Districts 657 and 8484 villages. See 
www. Jatimprov.go.id. (Accessed on 22 Pebruari 2009). 
5 See Ayu Sutarto, Setya Yuwana Sudikan (ed.), Pemetaan Kebudayaan Propinsi Jawa Timur; 
Sebuah Upaya Pencarian Nilai-nilai Positif (Jember: Kompyawisda, 2008), p. iv. 
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reside insuch a heterogeneous environment. According to Gabriel A. 
Almond and Sydney Verba, a culture which develops in one area is 
likely to have links with its local politics, democracy or even political 
figures.6 Almond and Verba’s analysis refers to the so-called political 
culture, namely the psychological orientation toward social objects, 
which constitutes a  political system. A person’s positive or negative 
attitude towards the political system depends on the motive of his or 
her political culture.7 At the same time, the development of a political 
culture occurs because of the complexity of its existing values. Thus, 
people’s life is filled by an interaction among different values which 
creates “political subculture” and in turn will determine the cultural 
future of the nation.8  
Based on this theory, this paper is an attempt to deal with several 
questions concerning the relationship of subcultures and political 
participation. Is it true that the political culture of the NU elites is a 
result of different geo-culture and geo-politics? How is the interaction 
between the local culture and politics built? Does this kind of 
interaction have any influence on the political participation of the NU 
elites? What is the nature of the the relationship pattern among the 
NU elites, especially in fighting for political goals?  
Although there are ten subcultures in East Java, this article focuses 
only on five subcultures, Mataraman, coastal areas, Arek, Madurese, and 
Pendalungan. This selection is based on the fact that most of the NU 
elites are concentrated in these five regions. 
NU and Politics: A Historical Overview  
The first political movement in Indonesia was Budi Utomo, 
established in 1908. It symbolized the resurrection of the nation to 
fight for its dignity. After the establishment of Budi Utomo, the spirit 
of revival continued to permeate throughout the country.  NU was 
born as a continuation of that spirit.  
There were three main reasons for the foundation of NU. First, in 
a local context, NU was founded as a defensive reaction against the 
                                                 
6 Gabriel A. Almond dan Sydney Verba, Budaya Politik: Tingkah Laku Politik dan 
Demokrasi di Lima Negara (Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 1990), p. 13. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See Nasarudin Syamsudin, “Aspek-aspek Budaya Politik Indonesia,” in Alfian and 
Nasarudin Syamsuddin (ed.), Profil Budaya Politik Indonesia (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1991), p. 
23. 
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reformist activities of Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam.9 Second, as 
stated by Alfian, NU was founded as an effort to provide a place for 
traditional Muslims who were mostly adherents of Sha>fi`i > school of 
Islamic law in the midst of political developments which gave little 
space for traditional Muslims. 10 
The third reason is that, in a global context, NU was established as 
a response towards the emergence of the modernist movement in the 
international arena, which was pioneered by Pan-Islamic groups. After 
the demise of the Ottoman Empire, which provided protection and 
support to traditional `ulama>’, Pan Islamic groups began to control 
Muslim states and discredit groups which had different points of 
view.11 This issue had sparked concerns among traditional `ulama>’ 
regarding the marginalization of their role, especially after the 
modernist Muslim groups gained some international support. 
All of those reasons formed the starting point of the founding of 
NU. The forming of the Komite Hijaz (Hijaz Committee) chaired by 
KH. Wahab Hasbullah was the first step. Komite Hijaz was an 
embryonic and ad hoc organization established to prepare a special 
envoy to attend the Congress of Muslims in Mecca. However, before 
departing to Mecca, and after consultation with several `ulama>’, it was 
eventually agreed, on 16 Rajab 1344 H. (January 31, 1926), to form an 
organization called NU The organization was first led by KH. Hasyim 
Asy’ari. To affirm the basic principle of this organization, Hasyim 
Asy’ari wrote a book called Qa>nu>n Asa >si> (basic principles), followed by 
another book I`tiqa>d Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama` >ah (the basic tenets of  
“the People of Sunnah and Group”, abbreviated as Aswaja). Both 
books were embodied in Khittah Nahdlatul Ulama, which was 
henceforth used as the basic reference for NU members in 
implementing its thought for social, religious and political purposes. 
                                                 
9 Martin van Bruinessen, NU, Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa dan Pencarian Wacana Baru, 
translated by Farid Wajidi (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), p. 17. 
10 The opinion of Alfian is quated by Laode Ida, Anatomi Konflik NU; NU, Elit Islam 
dan Negara (Jakarta: Penebar Swadaya, 1996), p. 9. 
11 Ibid., p. 28. From this condition it is then emerged the effort to establish 
organisation which later to be representative of traditional `ulama >’ in the World Muslim 
Congress in Mecca. 
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At the beginning of its establishment, NU emphasised its 
programs on education and the preaching of Aswaja principles.12 Until 
the 1930s, NU was consistent to work on these issues. However, NU’s 
attitudes then began to change, especially after the issuance of the new 
ordinance by the Dutch colonial authority (Guru Ordonnantie, 1925) 
which restricted the movement of religious teachers. The colonial 
authority also changed marriage laws, an act which seemed deliberately 
designed to prohibit polygamy, performed the autopsy of the Muslim 
corpses, and provided greater government subsidies to Christian 
schools. In general, this condition became the starting point for NU in 
general and especially its leaders to become actively involved in the 
state affairs.13 Another of NU’s political inclinations can also be 
observed through its national conference in 1938. At that time, there 
were several proposals to urge NU’s involvement in the political arena 
through its representatives in the Volksraad. Nonetheless, this proposal 
was rejected by the conference. 14  
The emergence of its young leader, Wahid Hasyim, who would 
later be a representative of the Muslim camp during events prior the 
independence, also marked the involvement of NU in politics. After 
independence, in 1952, NU became a political party. Furthermore, NU 
took part in the 195515 and 197116 general elections and gained 
significant votes. In 1973. after the New Order regime curtailed 
political rights, the regime decided to merge Islamic parties into a 
single party named Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Unitary 
Development Party), in which NU was unhappy with its political 
allies.17 Finally, in 1984 NU officially resigned from the political arena. 
                                                 
12 Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama >’ah was mentioned in NU statute after the national 
conference in 1979 especially in article 2: NU is based on Islam and aims for 
upholding Islamic law according to four Schools of Jurisprudence (madhhab: Maliki >, 
Hanafi >, Syafi’i> and Hambali>).  
13 Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama, p. 47. 
14 Ibid., p. 48. 
15 NU gained 18,4% from the total of national vote. See Alfian, Hasil Pemilihan Umum 
1955 untuk DPR (Jakarta: Leknas LIPI, 1971), p. 54. 
16 In the 1971 general elections NU gained 18,5 % votes. See Ali Haidar, Nahdlatul 
Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia; Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka 
Utama, 1994), p. 176. 
17 Robert W. Hefner, in Andree Feillard, NU Vis a Vis Negara, translated by Lesmana 
(Yogyakarta: LkiS, 1999), p. xviii. 
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This decision was later known as the spirit of the return to the 1926 
khittah (original track) of NU in which Abdurrahman Wahid, a son of 
Wahid, later the president of Indonesia in 1999-2001), was among the 
initiators.18 However, despite declaring that it had retreated from 
practical politics, the involvement of the NU elites (directly19 or 
indirectly20) in political arena remained apparent. 
In terms of its consistency in the framework of the 1926 khittah, 
NU experienced great internal turmoil because of the critical political 
events following the resignation of Suharto from the presidency in 
1998. This resignation marked the Reformation era and 
democratization in Indonesia.  As a result, certain members of the NU 
responded by suggesting the creation a party to accommodate NU 
interests. The proposal came not only from the party’s elites, but also 
from NU members across the country.21 Furthermore, there were 
thousands of people visiting Abdurrahman Wahid, the then chairman 
of NU Central Board (PBNU) while he was sick. All of them requested 
the central board of NU to establish a political party. Wahid then 
responded by saying that NU members needed to have a space in 
political arena.22 
Consequently, on 3 June 1998, the central board of NU formed tim 
lima23 (the committee of five). Their objective was to examine the  
likelihood of fulfilling the demands of the NU members to create a 
political party. On 20 June 1998, NU formed another team to assist24 
                                                 
18 Ida, Anatomi Konflik, p. 26. 
19 Many NU members participatee in politics as members of political parties. When 
that happened, they found it difficult to perform both roles. See Zainal Abidin Amir, 
Peta Islam Politik Pasca Soeharto (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2003), p. 109. 
20 NU is known for its cultural politics, civil society empowerment, strengthening local 
groups based on pesantren network, then increasing its bargain power to the 
government. In this situation, NU will have formidable position in the society. See 
Muhammad AS Hikam, Demokrasi dan Civil Society (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996), p. 234. 
21 Amir, Peta Islam Politik, p. 109. 
22 Asmawi, PKB; Jendela Politik Gus Dur (Yogyakarta: Titian Ilahi Press, 1999), p. 6. 
23 Team five was chaired by KH. Ma’ruf Amin (Rais Syuriah PBNU), KH. M. Dawam 
Anwar (Katib Am PBNU), Dr. KH. Said Aqiel Siradj (Vice Katib PBNU), HM. Rozy 
Munir, ME., M.Sc. (Chairman of PBNU) dan H. Akhmad Bagja (Secretary General of 
PBNU). See Amir, Peta Islam Politik, p. 111. 
24 Assitants to Team five were Arifin Junaedi (chairman), H. Muhyidin Arubusman, 
HM. Fachri Thaha Ma’ruf, Lc., Drs. H. Abdul Aziz, MA., Drs. H. Andy Muarly 
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tim lima. Through meetings and discussions, it was decided on 23 July 
1998 that NU should initiate the birth of a new political party called 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (The National Awakening Party). In the 
following year, PKB participated in the 1999 general elections and 
received a significant number of votes. 25 This success was repeated in 
the 2004 general election. The PKB once again obtained a large 
number of votes, 26 even though it decreased from the 1999 general 
election. 
The History of NU and political parties culturally affiliated to it 
cannot be separated from the role of `ulama>’27 and other figures from 
pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools).28 `Ulama>’ (Kiai, in 
Indonesian) is a figure identical with NU because NU was established 
by Kiais.29 In addition, kiais role as community leaders, teachers, as well 
as preachers, made them special for NU members.  
Kiais, in the NU political tradition, can be classified as an elite 
group.30 Not only do the kiais become the vote getters, but they also 
have political power. Some kiais are politicians, from political party 
leaders to members of parliament. The involvement of NU `ulama>’ in 
politics has had a long history since the early period of Masyumi 
                                                                                                      
Sunrawa, HM. Nasihin Hasan, H. Lukman H. Syaifuddin, Drs. Amin Said Husni, and 
A. Muhaimin Iskandar. See Ibid., p. 112. 
25 PKB was in third place with 13.336.982 votes, the first was PDIP and the second 
was Golkar. Muhammad Asfar, Pemilu dan Prilaku Memilih 1995-2004 (Surabaya: 
Pustaka Eureka and PusDeHAM, 2006), p. 118. 
26 Ibid., p. 127. 
27 According to Horikoshi, the position of kiais is different from the `ulama>’ in Java. 
`Ulama>’ have a deep knowledge in religion, but they do not have charisma or influence 
to the prople, while the kiais have reasonable religious knowledge but their charisma 
and infleunce is much bigger. However, Horikoshi stated that most of kiais have a 
fairly extensive religious knowledge. See Hiroko Horikoshi, Kiai dan Perubahan Sosial, 
transl. by Djohan Effendi and Muntaha Azhari (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), p. 235. 
28 NU board usually consists of kiai, relatives of kiai, alumni of pondok pesantren, or 
islamic education institution which has religious relation with NU. See Fealy, Ijtihad 
Politik Ulama, p. 52.  
29 Although not all kiai own Pondok Pesantren such as K.H. Muchit Muzadi in 
Jember, but most of them have Pondok Pesantren. 
30 Kiai is categorized as elite because charaterized as subjugete other people with his 
ability. See Geraint Parry, Political Elites (London: George Allin and Unwin Limited, 
1969), p. 46. 
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(Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia) development just years after the 
independence of Indonesia. Moreover, many pesantren alumni are also 
involved in politics. 
East Java in the Context of Culture and Politics;  
Hybridization and amalgamation 
In the story of the NU elites in East Java, a kind of hybridization 
has taken place, from a homogeneous society to a heterogeneous one. 
This has happened because of long and intense cultural interactions. 
According to Pieterse, hybridization is a way in which a certain form of 
culture is released and recombined into new forms, which refer to the 
contents of each culture among localities and also the transition 
between the localities to trans-locality culture.31 In addition, these 
groups interact, communicate, and build their own systems. In the 
process of interaction a dialogical process of meaning occurs where the 
messages are contested, integrated, or interchanged. Subject and object 
are mutually communicated. Friedman mentions this process as a form 
of “attribution meanings.” 32 
Furthermore, Pieterse divides hybridization into two forms, 
structural and cultural. Structural hybridization is a combination 
process which produces organizational options for the community, 
while cultural hybridization distinguishes various cultural responses 
that range from assimilation, segregation, to hybridization which 
destabilizes and obscures cultural barriers. This point results in a 
conflict and the emergence of an ‘imagined community’.33  
In the context of Islamic societies in East Java, hybridization is 
both structural and cultural. Mataraman Islam, which stretches from the 
western part of Jombang to the western part of Madiun, is a mixed 
culture of Hindu, Javanese and Islam. It has a different character and 
culture from other Muslim societies in East Java. The deep influence 
of the Islamic Mataram in community is undeniable. According to 
Woodward,34 areas in these regions are unique not because they 
                                                 
31 JN. Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” in M. Fetherstone, et al. (eds), Global 
Modernities (London: SAGE Publication, 1995), p. 68. 
32 J. Friedman, “Global System, Globalization and The Parameters of Modernities,” in 
Featherstone, Global Modernities, p. 70. 
33 Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” p. 208. 
34 Mark R. Woodward, Islam Jawa; Kesalehan Normatif versus Kebatinan, translated by 
Hairus Salim HS (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2006), p. 354. 
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maintain the pre-Islamic culture and religion, but because the concepts 
of Sufism, mystical path, and human perfection are practiced in the 
formulation of an imperial cult. 
Hence, texts, myths and other ideological statements have granted 
privileged access to the organization. A convincing example can be 
seen through a Javanese theory of ratu adil (messiah) common to the 
Mataraman NU elites. Theoretically, the king of Mataram is a perfect 
human being guided directly by the will of God, and able to ensure 
prosperity, power and spirituality for all of his people. This concept 
has an influence on Javanese culture, although this doctrine is not 
widely held. However, nowadays the Mataraman people generally 
consider that the instability which has been happening is because the 
king does not meet the ideal criteria. The movement of ratu adil has 
become a familiar practice.  
Long before the structural and cultural hybridization in Mataraman, 
Islam first touched the north coast communities of East Java through 
trade and business.35 People in coastal cities such as Surabaya, Gresik, 
Lamongan and Tuban not only created social contacts, but also a space 
for social change and reformation. Tolerance then became a common 
social belief. . Thus, the effort to embrace new beliefs could be made 
virtually without social conflict.  
In the context of Islam in the coastal areas, there took place a 
cultural hybridization of Majapahit into Islamic culture was due to the 
economic dependence of the rulers of Majapahit on Muslim merchants 
of the north coast who had an international reputation. Despite this, 
Islam in East Java’s coastal areas can be seen as more orthodox 
compared to Mataraman Islam because of the direct contact  with Islam 
in the Middle East. Many different terms have been coined to describe 
Islam in the region: “Javanese Islam” (Geertz) which is syncretic,36 
“multifocal Islam” (Beatty),37 “local Islam” (Mulder),38 and 
                                                 
35 Muhammad Habib Mustopo, Kebudayaan Islam di Jawa Timur (Yogyakarta: Penerbit 
Jendela, 2001), pp. 133-140. 
36 Clifford Geertz, Abangan, Santri dan Priyayi dalam Masyarakat Jawa (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Jaya, 1981), p. 175. 
37 Andrew Beatty, The Varieties of Javanese Religion (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), p. 62. 
38 Niels Mulder, Agama, Hidup Sehari-Hari dan Perubahan Budaya (Jakarta: Gramedia 
Pustaka Utama, 1999), p. 3. 
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“acculturative Islam” (Woodward).39 Nur Syam creates the term 
“collaborative Islam” to illustrate the features of Islam in coastal areas, 
claiming that north coast communities are the first community in Java 
who converted to Islam.40 This trend creates a dichotomy between 
orthodox Islam and collaborative Islam which also represents the 
dichotomy between coastal Islam and inland Islam. The basic 
characteristic of coastal Islam is obedience in practicing religious 
teaching. However, this religious commitment is not necessarily 
reflected in politics. The cultural influence of the coastal areas is very 
strong in shaping the political rationality of the local community. 
Long and intense interactions between coastal residents and the 
metropolitan culture of Surabaya formed a new subculture known as 
“Arek” community. Geographically, this community stretches along 
the eastern section of the Brantas River, from Pare Kediri to Jembatan 
Merah in Surabaya. Jembatan Merah is the “melting pot” of Arek 
culture. In an interview with Akhudiat, Jembatan Merah, and its 
surrounding areas, was referred to as the icon of Arek where many 
cultures of East Java met during the 19th and early 20th. For example, 
Chinese people settled on the east side, Arab and Malay people on the 
north side, and Javanese people on the south side.  
According to Akhudiat,41 “Arek” culture is the cultural 
hybridization of Majapahit, Islam, Mataram, and modernity (shaped by 
the Dutch). The influence of Majapahit can be seen from the use of 
the term “Adipati” (governor) by Sunan Ampel as the leader of 
Surabaya in the late 1400s, not “king” as used in Mataram. This is a 
tribute to Majapahit.42 Raden Rahmat or Sunan Ampel has a kinship 
relationship with Majapahit, through her aunt, Darawati, who married 
Kerta Wijaya. Raden Rahmat had orders to secure Ampel Denta 
Surabaya on the north coast in the 15th century, and later gained the 
title “Sunan Ampel”. Before Raden Rahmat’s leadership, Surabaya was 
ruled by a Muslim Majapahit official named Arya Lembu Sura in Glaga 
Arum (Peneleh) in the late 14th century, who was succeeded by Raden 
Rahmat as his grandson in law in the mid 15th  century and then by the 
                                                 
39 Woodward, Islam Jawa, pp. 364-5. 
40 Nur Syam, Islam Pesisir (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005), p. 91. 
41 Akhudiat, Masuk Kampung Keluar Kampung; Surabaya Kilas Balik (Surabaya: Henk 
Publica, 2008), p. 115. 
42 Akhudiat, Interview, 10 Nopember 2008. 
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descendants of Sunan Ampel in the 17th century.43 Meanwhile, 
Mataram started to control Surabaya at the end of Prince Pekik’s 
regime as the Mayor of Surabaya in the middle of 15th Century, which 
marked Mataram cultural influences in Surabaya. It is in this coastal 
Javanese culture that Islamic values influenced the formation of santri 
character in Arek culture. The ludruk performance by people of 
Surabaya was often used as social criticism against the government.44 A 
Surabaya ludruk iconic figure in that decade, Cak Durasim, often 
launched such sharp criticism. 
The meeting of three cultures resulted in a new hybridization, 
namely the hybridization of collective identity. Using Ridjal’s term,45 
the symbolic cultural identity of Majapahit, north coast areas, 
Mataraman, and Islam have been altered and “de-regionalized”. People 
in the north coast tend to be pious, just as those in Mataram have 
more syncretic styles. The teachings of Islam, brought by the Adipati 
Surabaya, Sunan Ngampel, and modern culture brought by the Dutch 
lead to the emergence of a new subculture called “Arek” culture. The 
characteristics of Arek culture are religious, nationalistic, egalitarian, 
and tolerant. The combination of these elements into a collective 
culture had an impact on political behavior. It was in this culture, 
which spread from Kediri, Jombang, Malang, to Surabaya, that NU 
and its elites originated.  
Meanwhile, in the eastern part of East Java there are two cultures 
and subcultures; Madurese and Pendalungan. This hybridization began 
with a meeting of the culture of Majapahit, Mataram and north coast 
within Madurese community. In term of its ecological background, 
Madura consists of dry and less productive land. According to 
Kuntowijoyo,46 ecological factors deeply influence the shaping of 
Madurese culture, which is generally attributed as temperamental and 
religiously fanatic. He stated that Madurese people are not unified by 
                                                 
43 Akhudiat, Masuk Kampung Keluar Kampung, pp. 115-6. 
44 Siti Zuhro, et al.., Demokrasi Lokal; Perubahan dan Kesinambungan Nilai-Nilai Budaya 
Politik Lokal di Jawa Timur, Sumatera Barat, Sulawesi Selatan dan Bali (Yogyakarta: Penerbit 
Ombak, 2009), p. 43. 
45 Tadjoel Rizal Bdr, Tamparisasi Tradisi Santri Pedesaan Jawa (Surabaya: Yayasan 
Kampusina, 2004), p. 343. 
46 Kuntowijoyo, Perubahan Sosial dalam Masyarakat Agraris Madura 1850-1940 
(Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2002), p. 75. 
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social dependence as in Java. Houses in Madura are also set apart from 
one another, different from in Java where people tend to live in 
clusters of adjacent buildings in residential areas. It is in this social 
background that religion plays a big role in Madura. Based on this 
view, lacking social dependence, people of Madura are often socially 
dependent upon religious clerics or kiai. As a result, they have a 
tendency to become religiously fanatic.  
In addition, there is a philosophy of Madurese people known as 
buppa’, bubbu, guru, ratoh (father, mother, teacher, king) which explicitly 
suggests the existence of strong adherence to the four components. In 
their philosophy, the four components are equal; father and mother 
are the ones who give birth, the teacher is the one who introduces 
learners to knowledge, and the king gives protection and security.47 
In addition to those living on the island of Madura, in the eastern 
part of East Java there are large Madurese communities who migrated 
to the area. They inhabit the region of Banyuwangi, Jember, 
Situbondo, Bondowoso, Probolinggo, Pasuruan, and Lumajang. The 
Dutch population census conducted in 1930 showed that 55% of the 
population was Madurese. This large population  could not be 
separated from the migration of 1806 when the Dutch opened the 
plantation of tobacco, coffee, rubber, and cocoa in Jember which 
required a large number of laborers. Thus, the migration created a new 
diaspora of Madurese in Java.  
According to Ayu Sutarto,48 culturally, there are differences 
between Madurese people living in Madura island and those inhabiting 
the eastern parts of East Java. This difference is partly because of the 
latter’s long interaction with Osing culture of Blambangan Hindu and 
‘native’ people of eastern parts of East Java. This interaction created a 
new culture called “Pendalungan”. Pendalungan is a new subculture mix 
between Madurese and Javanese in Blambangan. In terms of language, 
most of the people of Madura still speak Madurese language but mixed 
with Javanese. Some speak Javanese with a Madurese accent.  
                                                 
47 Hary Yuswadi, “Budaya Pendalungan,” in Ayu Sutarto and Setya Yuwana Sudikan 
(eds), Pemetaan Kebudayaan Propinsi Jawa Timur; Sebuah Upaya Pencarian Nilai-Nilai Positif. 
(Jember: Biro Mental Propinsi and Kompyawisda Jatim, 2008), p. 54. 
48 Ayu Sutarto, Setya Yuwana Sudikan (eds), Pemetaan Kebudayaan Propinsi Jawa Timur; 
Sebuah Upaya Pencarian Nilai-Nilai Positif (Jember: Biro Mental Propinsi and 
Kompyawisda Jatim, 2008), p. v. 
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In Pendalungan we can trace some pre-Islamic rituals of Osing 
culture, for instance Hindu’s tradition of offerings, Tola’ bala’ and ruwat. 
These rituals are still visible in many places, especially from the older 
generation. However, cultural and structural hybridization cannot be 
denied in the history of Madurese living in Java, who then became 
Pendalungan. This means that there is crossbreeding, especially in terms 
of the changing of social roles in Pendalungan multiethnic society. There 
is also cultural hybridization in Pendalungan in the form of mixture 
between various languages and traditions which form a ‘new culture’. 
Currently, for example, there are many Madurese people who choose 
to become government employees, an occupation that was previously 
uncommon among Madurese.49 
Furthermore, in addition to performing Javanese art shows in 
Madurese language, there is also cross-ethnic involvement by Javanese 
and Madurese in Chinese and Arabic art shows, without changing the 
format of the show and the language. For example on Chinese Lion 
Dance and Liang Liong in Jember, there are many performers, both 
dancers and musicians, who are Madurese and Javanese. This 
condition runs parallel to Arabic music of Gambus and Osing musical 
tradition of Kendang Kempul and Janger whose performers are Madurese 
and Javanese. This evidence clearly shows that, despite hybridization, 
there is ‘nothing entirely authentic’. In other words, there is an 
awareness and personal willingness to participate in the other ethnic 
group’s cultural identity either because of economic motivation or 
cultural responsiveness. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean they 
are stripped  of their own cultural identity and ethnic origin.  
In addition to the personal oriented hybridization, there is also 
hybridization that produces new art forms, such as Can-Macanan 
Kadduk arts and Patrol music in Jember, Singo Ulung and Puppet Kerte 
in Bondowoso. Can-macanan Kadduk is an art form originated from 
farmer practices depicting their activity to keep wild animals thieves 
away from their field.50 It is a combination between Osing Barongan, 
Chinese Lion Dance and Javanese Music. Despite its different 
background, Singo Ulung  is very similar to the Can-Macanan Kadduk, 
although its costumes and dance are more elaborate because of the 
involvement of professional choreographers.  Meanwhile, Puppet 
                                                 
49 Akhudiat, Interview, 10 Nopember 2008. 
50 Syamsul Gentong, Interview, 23 Nopember 2007. 
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Kerte, made of flat wood (such as krucil puppet), is a puppet show 
telling stories about everyday life. 51 
The identity of the new culture constructed by these two dominant 
communities is no longer confined to a particular ethnic culture, but is 
strongly influenced by the size of the dominant community in its 
cultural and social areas. Madurese people who are characterized as 
pious, high-tempered, expressive, and paternalistic are able to manage 
their community in Pendalungan. Correspondingly, the Javanese are able 
to communicate with them. The identity of this culture is a 
compromise of two dominant cultures which are successful in 
cooperating in the sense of forming a multicultural relationship. 
The following scheme explains the formation of cultural 
hybridization of Pendalungan subculture: 
 
Table 1: The Cultural Hybridization of Pendalungan Subculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Hary Yuswadi, “Budaya Pendalungan; Multikulturalitas 
dan Hibridasi Budaya Antaretnik,” in Sutarto and Setya 
Yuwana Sudikan (ed.), Pemetaan Kebudayaan Propinsi 
Jawa Timur, p. 60. 
The relationship between cultures which stimulates the creation of 
a new one (subculture) can be understood as the reality of habitus, habit 
and habitat relationship in a linear fashion. The relationship between 
cultures which are mediated by individuals and groups is one of mutual 
strength. In the concept of habitus, each individual has a cognitive 
cultural structure that has been established, which originates from 
                                                 
51 Rahardjo, “Pendalungan; Periuk Besar”. 
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experience and knowledge about his or her culture.52 Habitus enters in 
the space which is conceived of having a relationship with one 
another. In this social space, individuals with their habitus communicate 
to other individuals in various social realities that produce actions in 
accordance with the sphere and capital he has.53 Bourdieu states that 
“with habitus, individuals can understand realm and capital, and 
individuals can also question the structure, and even change it.”54 This 
means that the relationship between cultures held by individuals is 
likely to change due to the need to complement and improve the 
culture. By using the concept of habitus, shifts and changes, among 
cultural groups in East Java can be understood as natural processes, 
which take place as a result of mutual enforcement among the cultures.   
On the other hand, there are some unspoken rules regarding the 
relationship between individuals. Rules which usually work as a mode 
and emerge into what Bourdieu called as “symbolic violence”. 
Symbolic violence is very subtle violence, which is imposed on social 
agents without inviting resistance; instead, it invites conformity 
because it receives social legitimacy. Language, meaning, and the 
symbolic systems of the regime are embedded in individual thought 
through a hidden mechanism.55 It can be observed, for example, in the 
use of language, terminology, or culture within in society. In many 
ways, it is unnoticed that violence through language can be seen i.e. the 
Arek language included in Pendalungan and Coastal tradition. Moreover, 
coastal and Mataraman language are included in Arek language. 
Symbolic violence through language is unconsciously gained social 
legitimacy due to the very strong relationship. Bandura calls this 
condition “strengthening each other’s relationship.”56 Borrowing 
Christian Rahardjo’s expression,57  East Java can be seen as culturally  a 
“big pot” where several cultures eventually formed a new sub-culture 
                                                 
52 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), p. 13. 
53 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 101. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Richard Harker, et al. (eds), Habitus X Modal + Ranah = Praktik (Yogyakarta: 
Jalasutra, 2008), p. 116. 
56 A. Bandura, Sosial Learning Theory (New Jersey: Englewood-Cliffs-Pretice Hall Inc., 
1977), p. 124. 
57 Rahardjo, “Pendalungan: Periuk Besar”. 
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as a result of the interactions and changes in society. This large pot 
also influences the pattern of political participation which is based on 
the new culture. 
Geopolitical and cultural hybridization is one important factor that 
creates East Java’s dynamic and harmonious  political community . For 
example, in the context of culture, on the one hand the old culture  is 
maintained  as a form of respect; on the other new plausible ideas and 
cultures are also accepted. This condition  is mirrored in the political 
sphere. For example, when speaking of the Pendalungan community as a 
fusion process, we can also speak of it in the context of a multicultural 
society. This is because, in addition to the discovery of the 
combination that produces new culture, the respective cultural groups 
are still maintained. Further, the communities still interact with each 
other and preserve their individual identities and cultures. Bourdieu 
calls this condition a form of reassurance to the established cognitive 
structures.58 
In addition, this confirms Pieterse’s thesis about solid ethnic 
identity which remains intact amidst the hybridization process. A good 
example of this is Jember regency, as revealed by Christian Rahardjo,59 
in which the difference between thesouthern and northern areas in that 
regency is easily seen in their cultural activities. As a product of 
colonial-style ethnic segregation, the ethnic Javanese who inhabit the 
southern areas (i.e. sub-districts of Ambulu, Wuluhan, Balung, Puger, 
Gumukmas, Kencong, Jombang, Umbulsari, and Semboro) still 
practice Javanese culture both in terms of language, arts, and other 
customs. The Javanese community in Ambulu and Wuluhan, for 
example, preserve the Reog derived from their ancestors in Ponorogo, 
a regency of Mataraman community in southern East Java. In addition, 
almost all the communities in the south tend to be fond of Wayang 
Kulit, Jaranan, and Campursari. In terms of education, they still send 
their children to formal education, though there are also some Islamic 
boarding schools in that area. 
In northern areas, in contrast, people still preserve their Madurese 
culture. Madurese language is used in everyday live in sub-districts of 
Arjasa, Jelbug, Sukowono, Kalisat, Sumberjambe, Ledokombo, 
Mayang, and some parts of Pakusari. In addition to ludruk which is 
                                                 
58 Harker, et al (eds), Habitus X Modal, p. 120. 
59 Rahardjo, “Pendalungan: Periuk Besar”. 
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modified into Madurese-style, they also enjoy traditional art 
performances such as hadrah which has a Madurese influence. They are 
also fond of pengajian (religious speeches) because through this activity 
they can meet lorah (clerics) or gus (sons of clerics) who are considered 
to able to bring blessings for them. Meanwhile, in the central part of 
city and suburbs, ethnic Chinese are successful in doing business as 
well as preserving their traditional art performances such as Lion dance 
and Liang Liong. During the Chinese New Year festival, these art 
shows are performed publicly on the streets of Jember. 
Even though the younger generation tends to use Indonesian and 
Javanese with a Chinese accent, some people in the Chinese 
community also speak Mandarin. Since the majority of Chinese 
communities are Protestants or Catholics many of them send their 
children to schools which are managed by churches or Protestant or 
Catholic foundations. Meanwhile, the Arabs maintain their identity 
through marriage by not allowing the marriage of an Arab with a 
person of other ethnic groups. They also preserve their traditional 
music known as gambus. 
That is yet another characteristic of Pendalungan. A cultural 
community that is considered to have an acculturation of Java and 
Madura, has “a multicultural orchestra” that runs harmoniously and 
dynamically. Although they are frequently seen as generating a hybrid 
cultural product of Pendalungan, they still recognise their own history in 
the form of maintaining the identity of their ethnic culture. Those who 
live their lives in “the huge tub”, residing in the regencies of 
Bondowoso, Situbondo, Probolinggo and Lumajang, have developed a 
form of tolerant multicultural community.  
Cultural dialectic factors have a strong influence on the emergence 
of a new culture through interaction. The core of this interaction 
process turns individuals  into community members who learn the 
community culture and fully participate in the community. Where 
social circumstances, allow human beings to interact, their attitudes 
towards their social circumstances and also their behaviors and actions 
tend to strengthen one another. With their own idea of their 
established cultural identity within their developing cognitive structure 
(habitués) people tend to produce behaviors and actions (habits) as a 
reaction to their social circumstance (habitation). Simultaneously, habit 
influences habitation. Furthermore, the transformed habitation 
demands the development of new habitation, and thus it produces a 
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new habit and so forth. The relationships among these components 
are such that each strongly influences the others. These are what 
Bandura60 calls “interlocking determinants” and Thompson calls 
“compatibility conditions.” 
NU Elites of East Java and Multiethnic Political Participation 
The Muslim people of East Java are mostly NU members. In 
addition to the influence of cultural hybridization which affects the 
behavior, attitudes and patterns of the political elites, we can also find 
cultural, social and political change in a very broad scope shaping the 
pattern of NU elites’ political participation. This condition happens 
because of new thinking, especially about the concept of Aswaja 
(Sunnism). 
The dynamics of the NU elites’ political participation can be seen 
through different approaches, such as the geopolitical changes arising 
from the penetration of new cultures and subcultures through 
hybridization. It can also be seen through shifts in the organization and 
its social political factors. Another factor is the emergence of new 
thinking in Islamic doctrines as stipulated in the basic concept of 
Aswaja. The basic concept has stimulated a fragmentation of political 
attitudes among NU members. As Table 2 shows, the hybridization 
and geopolitical changes form the participation pattern of the NU 
elites in East Java. 
The political participation of the NU elites in East Java can be seen 
as an orchestra with its diversity of musical instruments joined into one 
dynamic rhythm. Each has its own characteristic patterns and 
behavior. What we might see on the surface seems to be chaos,  but in 
reality it is a reflection of beautiful and dynamic political culture.  
 
                                                 
60 Bandura, Sosial Learning Theory, p. 124. 
62 Friedman, “Global System, Globalization”.  
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Table 2: Geo-cultural, geo-politic and hybridization of NU political elites in 
East Java 
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This multicultural orchestra also has an impact on the political 
orchestra. The geo-political conditions in Madura, which position the 
kiai as unifiers, also occur in the Pendalungan community. The function 
of kiai as religious leaders and political figures is conceived as a 
compulsion that is still believed and accepted by the local community. 
Those prominent figures that possess political power are the kiai of 
Madurese or Pendalungan offspring. The late Kiai Achmad Shiddiq, the 
late Kiai Yusuf Muhammad, Kiai Khotib Umar, the late Kiai As’ad 
Syamsul Arifin, Kiai Sofyan, Kiai Fawaid, the late Kiai Wahid Zaini, Kiai 
Mutawakil Alallah, and Kiai Mahmud Zein are all examples of such 
personalities. 
Meanwhile, in the north coast areas, though kiai have a fairly 
considerable influence and power, theMuslim community in those 
areas are more rational in politics. The kiai-santri (teacher-student) 
relationship is more flexible. In politics, this means that the political 
preference of kiai is not necessarily followed by santri. It is stated in 
Friedman’s thesis that each figure is viewed as human being that has 
objectives, and his or her actions are aimed at those objectives and are 
only applicable in that region.62 Although the position of kiai as 
religious figure is very authoritative, he is unable to press his 
congregation to follow his political preference. In the history of 
parliament elections, the political party supported by kiai has not 
always had a landslide victory. This differs from Madurese and 
Pendalungan areas, where  the kiai’s political preference strongly 
influences the political tendency of the santri. For instance, after the 
move of Kiai Fawaid of Situbondo from the PKB to the PPP, 
following his dispute with Gus Dur (Kiai Abdurrahman Wahid), the 
PPP (which only got 1 seat in the 1999 elections), obtained  as many as 
7 seats in the 2004 local parliamentary elections. However, in general 
the PKB remains the party of NU members, although the victory of 
the PKB in Pendalungan and Madura is usually more convincing than  in 
north coast areas.  
Meanwhile, in the more heterogenic, Arek region, NU’s political 
orchestra show is more dynamic and euphonious. The culture of santri 
and modernist are integrated into one political culture domain; so there 
is no permanent winner. Religious and nationalistic spirits are 
integrated to create the dynamic political orchestra of the Arek 
community. Thus, sometimes the religious group represented by the 
PKB is victorious; in another period the nationalist PDIP comes out 
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on top. The case of Surabaya is a  clear example. In the 1999 
parliamentary election, the PDIP won, whereas in 2004, the PKB was 
victorious. This political dynamic is found in nearly all regions which 
are categorized as Arek, from Surabaya all the way to Kediri. 
Another manifestation of this political elite orchestra in the 
context of NU is the Islamic boarding schools in Jombang. Four 
historically related large Islamic boarding schools are Tebuireng, 
Tambakberas, Denanyar, and Peterongan. Since the New Order 
regime, the political preferences of the NU elites affiliated to those 
boarding schools has tended to be different. The Tebuireng families 
are active in the PPP, PKB and PKNU; Tambakberas families tend to 
join the PKB, and recently the PPP and PDIP, particularly Kiai Hasib, 
who is currently a member of the House of Representatives from the 
FPDIP. Peterongan has long been tied to Golkar through the Kiai 
Musta`in, although some figures are also active in the PKB, PPP and 
PAN. Meanwhile, Denanyar is still connected to the PKB through the 
family of Iskandar, who has a large influence, both at a national and 
local (Jombang) level. These conditions back up the view of Tadjoer 
Rizal, in his research in Sumber Arum Jombang, who states that 
cultural hybridism may truly have an impact on other aspects of 
transformation, as well as on the complicated political culture of Arek 
(including in Islamic Boarding Schools culture). It may also cause 
deviations in political preference due to the strength of cultural 
hybridism into political sector. 
In the Reformation era from 1998 up to the present, the political 
tendencies of the traditional coastal community and the Madurese, 
both in Madura island and Pendalungan, did not go beyond the political 
basis of the PKB. Meanwhile, those who broke  with Gus Dur tend to 
back the PPP, which has traditionally had a relationship with the NU 
elites. Besides, in Arek tradition, transformation does not only occur in 
kiai-santri relationship but also goes beyond the mono-political NU 
tradition that has meant it was  hard to escape from the traditional 
politic circle. As stated by Asfar, while conducting research in 
Jombang, he addresses a transformation from traditional to rational.63 
In this context, the political choice of Kiai Hasib of Tambakberas to 
PDIP and Gus Luqman of Peterongan to PAN naturally and 
traditionally goes beyond political transformation as stated in Asfar’s 
                                                 
63 Asfar, “Pergeseran Otoritas Kepemimpinan Politik Kiai”, p. 77. 
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study. Arek culture can be analyzed using Emerson’s Rational 
Exchange Theory that focuses attention on the benefit gained from 
and contribution given in the process of social interaction.64 Rationally, 
people will act when they derive benefit from their actions. The role of 
Islamic boarding schools’ elites in this case traditionally is 
understandable since they appear to benefit from the transaction.  
Meanwhile, in Mataraman tradition, the political orchestra tends to 
be static. The influence of Mataram and Sufism embraced by the 
Keraton is dominant compared to regions in East Java. Sufism, the 
typical characteristic of the Keraton, is used to explain, organize and 
give value to various aspects of life. All of these are in line with what 
Martin calls a sub-textual assumption,65 the subject itself being the 
series of basic interpretations in Java and the Muslim world as a whole. 
However, in the Mataraman Muslim community, the way they interpret 
and implement those axioms has an impact on how culture, politics 
and religion are perceived. 
This interpretation process generates two basic forms of religiosity, 
each of which has a wide series of multiple variants with personal, 
class-based and regional characteristics. In general, Javanese Muslims 
believe the rites of life such as circumcision, marriage and bereavement 
ceremony should be held in accordance with Islamic law, yet they must 
comply with other aspects of pietism that are freely chosen. In these 
two cases, according to Woodward, the implementation of the micro- 
and macro-cosmos into cosmologist, religiosity, social and politics 
thoughts transform the character of Javanese mystical Sufism.66 In 
general, Sufism is a private devotion in Islam. Its focus is the 
relationship between an individual mystic and his or her God. In 
Mataraman region, the structure of this mystical ideology plays a role 
in social thoughts and traditional politics. 
One of the reasons the NU elites which tend to affiliate with the 
PKB and PPP do not completely occur in Mataraman region, is 
because there is this micro- and macro-cosmos implementation in real 
life (politics), particularly Sufism. Geertz states that the form of pietism 
practiced by priyayi or abangan Muslims (to distinguish from pesisir 
                                                 
64 Friedman and Michael Mechter, The contribution of Rational Choice, p. 202. 
65 As quoted by Asep Saiful Muhtadi, Komunikasi Politik Nahdlatul Ulama’ (Jakarta: 
LP3ES, 2004), p. 237. 
66 Woodward, Islam Jawa Kesalehan Normatif.  
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[north coastal] santri, Arek, and Madurese) has very broad personal and 
regional variants.67 The distinction finally depends on individual 
interpretation, two cases that tend to merge into one another. The 
function of kiai in daily life is mostly played out in a religious aspect 
through t }ari >qah (Sufi brotherhood) practices/rituals. Meanwhile, their 
political functions tend to be more personal and benefit-oriented. .  
The fact that geo-cultural and geo-political considerations 
contribute to the tendency of political preference can be seen from 
parliamentary elections from 1955 up to 2004. In fact, culture and 
ideology, which play an important role in determining the political 
participation of the East Java community, cannot be neglected. The 
cultural and ideological factors (particularly the so called Islam 
supporters and Nationalists) can be easily observed from the results of 
these parliamentary elections over the years. In the 1955 parliamentary 
election in which 39 parties competed, NU and Masyumi   both highly 
dependent on the Muslim communities of East Java, were the major 
political powers. In contrast, in the faction of non-religious parties, the 
action of PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) and PKI (Indonesian 
Communist Party) also had a great influence. The result of the 1955 
parliamentary election positioned these four parties as winners of a 
significant share of the votes. In this election, the largest shares of 
votes were gathered by the NU3,370,000 votes.or 34.1% of the 9 
million total electorate. With that large proportion, NU gained 20 
legislative seats or 31.7% of the total 63 seats. On the other hand, the 
PNI and PKI competed fiercely with one another for second position. 
The PKI was able to gain 23.3% of votes and obtained 14 seats. 
Meanwhile, PNI got 22.8% or 14 seats and Masyumi received 11.2%.68  
Of those four big parties, it seems that the power of Islamic and 
non-Islamic parties were in close competition in East Java. If 
compiled, the votes collected by the NU and Masyumi party 
dominated 45.3%, meanwhile PNI and PKI reached 46.1%. Yet, if 
viewed from the distribution of votes based on geographical position, 
Islamic-based parties dominated the eastern part of East Java. They 
dominated ‘Tapal Kuda’ (horse shoe) regions such as Bondowoso, 
Situbondo, Banyuwangi, Jember, Probolinggo, Pasuruan, Sidoarjo, 
Gresik, Lamongan, Surabaya and Madura. In this region, Surabaya was 
                                                 
67 Geertz, Santri, Abangan, Priyayi, p. 173. 
68 Kompas, 8 July 1971. 
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the sole area that was not dominated by NU. In contrast, the western 
parts of East Java such as Bojonegoro, Tuban, Madiun, Ngawi, and 
Magetan up to the southern part of East Java were dominated of PNI 
and PKI.69 
Table 3: The Result of the 1955 East Java Parliamentary Election 
Parties 
 
Outcomes 
(%) 
Winning concentration 
(Party Basis) 
NU 34.1 % Situbondo, Probolinggo, Pasuruan, Sidoarjo, 
Surabaya, Gresik, Pasuruan and Madura 
PKI 23.3 % Blitar, Nganjuk, Bojonegoro, Tuban, Ngawi 
PNI 22.8 % Blitar, Nganjuk, Bojonegoro, Tuban, Ngawi, 
Madiun, Magetan 
Masyumi 11.2 %  
Source: Kompas, 8 June 1997 and 10 February 2004; Research 
and Development Division of East Java Kompas; 
www.situsjatim.com; Moch Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan 
Kekuatan Kiai dalam Rekrutmen Politik,” in 
Syamsudin Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di Tengah 
Oligarki Partai; Proses Nominasi dan Seleksi Calon Legislatif 
Pemilu 2004 (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2005), 
p. 31; Asfar, Pemilu dan Prilaku Memilih; Iskandar 
Ritonga et al., “Kiprah Perempuan di Arus Politik 
Indonesia” (Unpublished research report, Surabaya, 
2005). 
This competition  recurred in subsequent parliamentary elections. 
In 1971, Golkar gained 54.9%, while the Islamic parties, which later on 
merged into the PPP, obtained 39.4%. At the time, the NU heartlands, 
such as Pasuruan, Banyuwangi, Bondowoso, Situbondo, Jember and 
Madura island and other regencies in the eastern areas, were not 
dominated by Golkar. Yet, the western  areas adjoining Central Java, 
such as Ponorogo, Pacitan, Ngawi, Madiun and Bojonegoro, 
previously the stronghold of  PKI and PNI, were entirely dominated 
by Golkar.70  
                                                 
69 Ibid.  
70 Kompas, 6 February 2004. 
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The next parliamentary election furthered the success story of 
Golkar. In 1977, Golkar raised its share of the vote to 59.2%, whereas 
the PPP declined to just 35.9%. Golkar won in Situbondo, 
Bondowoso, Jember, Sampang, and Sumenep, the regencies that had 
traditionally  supported the Islamic parties. The power of the PPP was 
even poorer in the 1982 and 1987  elections; with NU’s policy in 1984 
of “going back to the 1926 khittah” which automatically meaning they 
withdrew from political life; thus the PPP’s votes hit an all time low 
with just21.4% in 1987. The PPP was beaten in almost all regencies, 
except Mojokerto, in which it remained undefeatable. In contrast, the 
Golkar reached 70.7%, its highest ever proportion of the popular vote 
in East Java.71 
Table 4: The Results of East Java Parliamentary Election (1971-1982) 
Parliament 
election 
Parties Outcomes 
(%) 
Winning 
concentration 
(Parties basis) 
Remark 
Golkar 54 % Ponorogo, Pacitan, 
Ngawi, Madiun, 
Bojonegoro  
Previously 
stronghold 
of PNI 
and PKI 
NU and 
Islamic 
Parties 
39.3 % Situbondo, 
Probolinggo, 
Pasuruan, Sidoarjo, 
Surabaya, Gresik, 
Pasuruan, 
Banyuwangi and 
Madura 
 
Other 
parties 
7.4 %   
1971 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1977 
Golkar 59.2 % Pasuruan, 
Situbondo, 
Bondowoso, Jember, 
Sampang, Sumenep  
NU basis, 
but won 
by Golkar  
 PPP 35.9 % Madura, Tapal Kuda Gained 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
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Parliament 
election 
Parties Outcomes 
(%) 
Winning 
concentration 
(Parties basis) 
Remark 
and north coastal 
area. 
votes, but 
defeated 
 PDI  5.4 %   
1982 Golkar 69.8 % Still dominant in 
western areas and 
won in nearly all 
cities and regencies. 
 
 PPP 25.60 % Madura and Tapal 
Kuda areas 
 
 PDI  4.8%   
Source: Kompas, 8 June 1997 and 10 February 2004; Research 
and Development Division of East Java Kompas; 
www.situsjatim.com; Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan 
Kekuatan Kiai,” in Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di 
Tengah Oligarki, p. 31; Asfar, Pemilu dan Prilaku Memilih; 
Ritonga et al., “Kiprah Perempuan.” 
In 1992, the PPP increased its share of the vote  to 25.2%, while 
Golkar though decreasing slightly, were still victorious with 58.8% of 
the total votes. Some municipalities and regencies that previously 
supported Golkar, were won back by the PPP. Such was the case 
particularly in municipalities and regencies in the eastern part of East 
Java. In 1997, the last election in the New Order era, the PPP 
continued its rise. In cities and regencies such as Bangkalan, 
Pamekasan, Jombang, Bondowoso and Surabaya City as well, where 
competition with Golkar was unavoidable. Pasuruan was the only area 
that was still dominated by Golkar. In general, the Golkar’s votes 
reached 62.9%, while PPP obtained 33.9%.72 
Table 5: The Result of East Java Parliamentary Election (1987-1997) 
Parliament 
election 
Parties Outcomes 
(%) 
Winning concentration 
(Parties basis) 
1987 Golkar 70% Dominated nearly all regencies and 
cities 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
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Parliament 
election 
Parties Outcomes 
(%) 
Winning concentration 
(Parties basis) 
PPP 21.4 % Madura and parts of Tapal Kuda 
areas 
PDI  8.2 %  
 
 
 
1992 Golkar 58.8 % Fewer votes in Madura and Tapal 
Kuda areas 
 PPP 25.2 % Significant votes in Pasuruan and 
the eastern parts of East Java 
 PDI 18.4 %  
1997 Golkar 62.9 % Dominant in western areas, 
Struggling in Tapal Kuda areas. 
 PPP 33.9 % Though defeated, gaining 
significant votes in Surabaya, 
Bangkalan, Pamekasan, Jombang, 
and Bondowoso. 
 PDI  4.2 %  
Source: Kompas, 8 June 1997 and 10 February 2004; Research 
and Development Division of East Java Kompas; 
www.situsjatim.com; Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan 
Kekuatan Kiai,” in Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di 
Tengah Oligarki, p. 31; Asfar, Pemilu dan Prilaku Memilih; 
Ritonga et al., “Kiprah Perempuan.” 
The 32 years of New Order political hegemony could not erase the 
political loyalty of East Java communities toward the identity and 
ideology of political parties. The result of the 1999 parliament election 
strengthened this assumption. Of 48 political parties competing in this 
province, the rivalry between parties that depended on the basis of 
Muslim mass and nationalist seemed more competitive. In general, 
East Java was the major base of the PKB in 1999.. The PKB gained 
35.48%, whereas the PDIP got 33.81%. This relative share of the vote 
reminds us of the 1955 parliamentary election, in which political 
parties such as NU, PKI and PNI competed to obtain the 
influence/power in this area. In East Java, in 1955 NU had obtained 
34.14%, the PKI 23.29%, and the PNI 22.80%. Meanwhile, Masyumi 
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gained just 11.24%.73  A predictably poor result was experienced by 
Golkar party. Where before,it had dominated six parliamentary 
elections during the New Order regime, Golkar now got only 12.7% in 
1999. 
The rivalry between the PKB and PDIP occurred up to regency 
and city level. Although, the PKB was dominant at provincial level, the 
PDIP dominated at regency and city levels. Around 23 regencies/cities 
in the western part of East Java were held by this party. The PKB 
merely dominated 13 regencies/cities and was concentrated in Tapal 
Kuda and Madura areas, excluding Pamekasan which was won by the 
PPP. This pattern was not very different from that of the 1955 
parliament election. The cities/regencies in the western part of East 
Java was under domination of non-religious parties such as the PKI 
and PNI, while in the eastern areas, particularly Tapal Kuda and north 
coastal area  the Islamic parties triumphed. The difference was that, 
while the regencies/cities of Malang, Jombang, and Sidoarjo in 1955 
parliament election were dominated by NU, in the 1999 parliament 
election, PKB’s share was less than the PDIP’s. In contrast, 
Trenggalek, which in the past was of the base of the PNI, was won by 
the PKB rather than the PDIP. 
The success story of PKB continued in  2004 with 31.3% of the 
votes while in contrast, the PDIP picked up only24.3% of the votes. 
Apparently, traditional voters of PDIP voted for Golkar, which 
increased its votes to 15.3%, and other nationalist parties like the 
Democrats. Geographically, the votes of PKB, PDIP or Golkar 
originated from their traditional regions. 
Table 6: The Result of East Java Parliamentary Election in the Post  New 
Order Era (1999-2004) 
Parliament 
election 
Parties Outcomes 
(%) 
Winning 
concentration 
(Parties basis) 
Remark 
PKB 35.5 % 13 regencies/cities: 
Madura, Tapal Kuda 
areas and Trenggalek 
 1999 
PDIP 35.3 % 23 regencies/cities, 
particularly in 
 
                                                 
73 Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan Kekuatan Kiai,” in Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di Tengah 
Oligarki, p. 31.  
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Parliament 
election 
Parties Outcomes 
(%) 
Winning 
concentration 
(Parties basis) 
Remark 
western and southern 
regencies. 
Golkar 12.7%   
PPP 5.2%   
2004 PKB 31.3% Votes slightly 
decreased 
PDIP’s 
rival party 
in 
Surabaya 
 PDIP 24.3% Votes significantly 
decreased  
Vote 
migration 
to PD 
 Golkar 15.3%   
Source: Kompas, 8 June 1997 and 10 February 2004; Research 
and Development Division of East Java Kompas; 
www.situsjatim.com; Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan 
Kekuatan Kiai,” in Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di 
Tengah Oligarki, p. 31; Asfar, Pemilu dan Prilaku Memilih; 
Ritonga et al., “Kiprah Perempuan.”  
Looked at from a geo-political point of view, the general tendency 
of the voters’ attitude in the parliamentary elections from 1955 to 2004 
did not schange ignificantly. From 1955 onward the Mataraman area 
was dominated by the PKI and PNI, and in the 1971 parliamentary 
election was dominated by Golkar. Meanwhile, in post-New Order 
parliamentary elections, Golkar’s position was rivaled by the PDIP. In 
this area, the votes of the PKB and/or NU-based political parties had 
never been significant. In contrast, however, they dominated on the 
island of Madura and Pendalungan. The performance of NU in the 1955 
election was fairly strong, and such was the case in the 1999 and 2004 
parliamentary elections, in which the PKB won in these areas.  
In Arek and north coastal areas, nationalist and religious parties 
went neck and neck with no dominant political party. For instance, in 
the 1955 parliamentary election, in Surabaya and its surroundings, the 
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NU and nationalist parties’ votes ran very close. This trend 
wasrepeated in the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections, which the 
PDIP won in 1999 and the PKB won in 2004. 
This pattern shows that geo-cultural and geo-political factors 
obviously had an impact on the community’s political preferences. 
Later, this  helps us to understand the participation of the NU elites in 
those five areas. 
Table 7: Typology and Political Preference of the NU Elites in East Java 
Political Tendency  
Areas 
Ethnics/ 
language 
Historical 
relationship 
Religion-
Politics 
relationship 
Old 
Order 
New 
Order 
Post 
New 
Order 
Mataraman 
(Madiun, 
Magetan, 
Nganjuk, 
Kediri) 
Javanese/ 
Central Java 
(Keraton) 
Under 
authority of 
syncretic 
Islamic 
Mataram 
Kingdom 
Rational, 
prefer 
substance to 
symbol, 
obedient to 
king/state 
leader, tend 
to apply 
politics 
personally 
PNI and 
PKI 
Golkar 
and 
PDI 
PDIP 
and 
Golkar 
Pesisiran/ 
North coast 
(The northern 
area Gresik, 
Lamongan 
and Tuban) 
Javanese/ 
Eastern 
Java (Arek 
language) 
Orthodox 
Islamic area 
Rational-
pragmatics 
Substance 
and symbol 
walk 
simultan-
eously 
Kiai-
santri/comm-
unity 
relationship 
is more 
rational. 
NU and 
Masyumi 
PPP 
and 
Golkar 
PKB, 
Golkar 
and 
PAN 
Madura 
island 
(Madura 
island) 
Madurese/ 
Madura/-
East 
Madura 
(gentle), 
West 
Madura 
Traditional 
Islam area 
(Pesantren) 
 
Traditional, 
charisma, 
Rigidly 
maintain 
religious 
tradition 
symbol, 
NU PPP, 
some 
are 
Golkar 
Majority 
PKB  
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Political Tendency  
Areas 
Ethnics/ 
language 
Historical 
relationship 
Religion-
Politics 
relationship 
Old 
Order 
New 
Order 
Post 
New 
Order 
(rough) 
 
Fanaticism to 
Kiai 
Pendalungan 
(Jember, 
Banyuwangi 
Bondowoso, 
Situbondo, 
Lumajang, 
Pasuruan, 
Probolingo) 
 
Madurese/ 
Madura-
Java 
(mixed) 
The 
migrants of 
Madura 
island in 19th 
and the 
beginning of 
20th century 
Traditional, 
charisma but 
pragmatics, 
rigidly 
maintain 
religious 
tradition 
symbol, 
Fanaticism to 
Kiai 
NU PPP 
some 
are 
Golkar 
Majority 
PKB 
Arek 
(Surabaya, 
Sidoarjo, 
Malang, 
Jombang) 
Javanese/-
use Arek 
Javanese 
language, 
some use 
Madurese 
Most are 
migrants 
from various 
areas in East 
Java 
Rational 
pragmatics 
(due to the 
influence of 
metropolitan 
popular 
culture) 
Egalitarian, 
tolerant and 
rational 
cosmo-
politan) 
PNI, 
PKI, 
NU and 
Masyumi 
Golkar, 
PPP 
and 
PDI 
PKB 
and 
PDIP 
are arch 
rivals in 
these 
area 
We should draw some distinctions between the political 
participation pattern during and after the New Order era. In the New 
Order era, the community’s political participation tended to be 
‘mobilized’ participation, and did not act completely from an 
awareness of their political choice. Their participation in political 
campaigns and in polling stations tended to be mainly due to pressures 
from the New Order regime. They were forced to obey the regime 
since they were afraid to be labeled as “Anti Development”, “Right 
Extremists (Muslim Fundamentalists)” or “Left Extremists 
(Communists)”. This stigma was quite effective in mobilizing the 
society to give political legitimacy to New Order regime. In contrast, in 
the “Reformation” era, political participation was more autonomous 
because the authoritarian New Order regime, which had used all 
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means to conduct cooptation and penetration into all lines of life, had 
been terminated and transformed into a more substantive democracy. 
In such a free political atmosphere, the motivation behind the 
political actions of the NU elites washighly varied. Among the crucial 
points has been the consideration behind their engagement to a certain 
political party. This case can be examined using Schultz’s theory75 of 
“because motive” (motive that becomes the basis of political 
involvement) and “in order to motive”. Based on this theory, the 
reason for the NU elites’ political involvement is strictly religious. 
According to them, their involvement in politics is a religious 
obligation of each Muslim as stipulated in the Qur’a>n. Due to this 
instruction, joining politics is considered as part of devotion to God. 
God will grant reward in the Hereafter to those performing this 
instruction (the ‘in order to’ motive). In addition, Berger added a 
pragmatic motive, according to which a person conducts an action 
based on self-interest.76 In this context, the interest of kiais with their 
political involvement enables them to access power through their 
patronage over santris, alumni or links. 
The political motivation of kiai is not permanent, because it can 
change due to pressure and continuous political conflict. In this 
context, the NU elites’ involvement in politics is “symbolic” since they 
have struggled and improved the party, but there would be a possibility 
of withdrawal from politics (mufa>raqah) as shown by the resignation of 
some NU elites from the PKB and foundation of another party called 
PKNU. In this context, Blumer states that every human being has the 
wisdom to modify and changee. This happens because of their ability 
to interact with themselves, which enables them to examine a number 
of opportunities, assess their relative advantages and disadvantages and 
later on select one of the various opportunities.77 
 
 
                                                 
75 Ian Craib, Teori-Teori Sosial Modern: Dari Parson Hingga Habermas (Jakarta: Rajawali 
Press, 1992), p. 126. 
76 Peter L. Berger, RJ. Neuhaus, “To empower people; the Role of Mediating Structure 
in Public Policy,” in DC. Korten and R. Klauss (eds), People Centered Development 
(Connecticut: Kumarian, 1984), pp. 253-4. 
77 Blumer, Symbolic Interaction, p. 78. 
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The Politics of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama >` ah; 
Symbolics and  Pragmatics 
Besides the hybridization and amalgamation of culture that form 
the character of the political participation of the NU elites in East Java, 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) also constitutes a distinctive feature of the 
NU elites’ politics. As NU is a religious social organization, thus, it is 
only natural that religious values should function not only as basic 
rules within their religious rituals, but also should also be implanted 
into their wider life. 
Religious values of Aswaja give the NU elites a flexible space to be 
further involved in a space that is social-politically not their discipline. 
The values developed by NU are flexible, universal and inclusive. 
Although there is an assumption that Aswaja political values are 
considered as legitimizing action for the NU social-political journey, 
the values indeed are substantially anchored in the Qur’a >n and Sunnah, 
the normative sources of Aswaja values. 
Meanwhile, the most important aspect in Aswaja religious view is 
the fiqh. Fiqh discourse is more dominant than `aqi >dah (Islamic 
theology), akhla>q (Islamic ethic) and tas}awwuf (Sufism). Fiqh is widely 
used by the NU elites as a basic argument and response to social-
political issues that appear both within and outside NU. For instance, 
the principle of “conserving good values of the past and adopting 
better new values” (al-muh }a>faz}ah `ala > al-qadi >m al-s}a >lih} wa al-akhdh bi al-
jadi >d al-as}lah}) is always used by the NU elites in several important 
decisions, though legally it contradicts organization rules. By this norm, 
any conflicts between religion and politics can be overcome through 
reconciliation and therefore conflicts are avoided. One example of this 
is the involvement of Kiais listed as NU structural officials as well as 
being active in a political party. This double identity is basically 
forbidden in NU. Such conflicts of interest can be overcome through 
religious explanation and argumentation. The NU kiai involved in 
founding the PKB can remain active in NU as well as the PKB 
because of this logical reasoning. There was also the case of NU kiais 
who became officers, founders or active participants of PKB, then 
resigned and founded another party, the PKNU. All of these 
conflicting interests religiously can be accepted using this logical 
reasoning. This religious basis is also frequently used by the NU elites 
when they are considered of having broken the principle of “going 
back to the 1926 khittah”, which strictly limits NU activities in social 
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and religious programs. The consideration of NU  benefit and service 
for national interest is often used as a reason by those who are both 
partyofficeholders and part of the NU structure. 
Another jurisprudential maxim that is frequently used says that “if 
there are two conflicting hazards, then the least hazardous is 
performed” (idha> ta`a>raz}at mafsadata >ni ru’iya a’z}amuha > d}arara bi irtika >b 
akhaffihima >). This maxim is basically used in risk management. The 
political choices of the NU elites in anticipating social-politics 
consequences are made according to the measurement of the effects 
that could possibly result from those actions. Ali Haidar’s claims, there 
is “nothing absolute” in the political tradition of the NU elites.78 By 
this maxim, the move of the NU elites from the PKB to the PKNU or 
PPP is based on a consideration that the PKB is considered to have 
deviated from the principle of Aswaja and to have given no protection 
to Islam by appointing officers and legislative members of the PKB 
with non-Muslim. The religious motivation of PKNU figures in 
founding the party was to save the political aspirations of the group’ or 
Jama’ah NU. According to some NU elites who resigned from the 
PKB, on the grounds that non-Muslims and non-NU figures had been 
admitted to the PKB, it means that the PKB was in a hazardous 
condition and there should be a political mechanism to represent the 
political aspirations of NU community. 
Another maxim that is frequently used is “avoiding hazards is 
more important than generating benefits” (dar` al-mafa >sid muqaddam `ala 
jalb al-mas}a>lih}). This maxim is used by the NU elites when they find 
themselves in a dilemma. Thus, they will take a decision that is able to 
reduce risks to a minimum rather than keeping pursuing benefits. In 
this context, the involvement of the NU elites in a variety of political 
parties, their resignation from the PKB, and the founding of the 
PKNU is a part of minimizing the hazard after the failure of the PKB 
to implement the mandate of NU. 
Suggestions for avoiding hazards is frequently related to the two 
broader principles of mas}lah}ah and amr bi al-ma’ru >f wa nahy `an al-munkar. 
Mas}lah}ah (lit. “welfare” or “benefit”) which are concepts  in Islamic 
legal theory proposing that the ultimate goal of Islamic law is 
community interest or prosperity. As the contrary of mas}lah}ah is 
mafsadah, preventing mafsadat is mas}lah}ah. Interpretation and 
                                                 
78 Haidar, Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia, p. 322. 
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implementation of mas }lah}ah by the NU elites is based on the decision 
making by measuring the advantages and disadvantages of the action 
to be taken. The way that gives most benefits or avoids most hazards is 
the most appropriate one. 
Meanwhile, amr bi al-ma`ru >f wa nahy `an al-munkar suggests 
encouraging good deeds and preventing cruelties. This concept is not a 
fiqh concept but a command taken from the Qur’a>n, that is, what  is 
explicitly stated in the Qur’a>n (3:104). Executing amr bi al-ma`ru >f wa 
nahy `an al-munkar is an obligation for every Muslim. According to 
Achmad Siddiq, besides personal obligation to give advice to 
government, he argues that NU can truly execute amr bi al-ma`ru >f wa 
nahy `an al-munkar through political participation within available 
political institutions.79 
Based on his observation of NU’s political experiences, Fealy 
proposes three principles, namely wisdom, flexibility and moderatism 
in politics that emanate from Aswaja teaching.80 The term wisdom is 
used within the definition of taking conducive action to gain benefits 
or to avoid the loss. Flexibility means NU always tries to adjust/adapt 
to the situation and never proposes an absolute or unconditional 
attitude. Furthermore, moderation may be defined as a wish to avoid 
an extreme position and greater care in acting and stating an opinion. 
In NU political discourse, these ideas are clearly held. Moderate 
manners, particularly the tendency to select common/general ways, 
known as the “middle way approach”, is an Islamic value as well as a 
Javanese philosophy. 
In the political history of the NU, since the Old Order up to the 
Reformation era, there have been numerous political decisions by the 
NU elites considered ambiguous and ambivalent. Accordingly, negative 
perceptions frequently emerged due to the lack of knowledge about 
NU’s religious basis. Masyumi, for instance, considered the actions of 
NU inconsistent, weak, and opportunistic.81 On the other side, the 
political moves of NU were unpredictable. In one issue, NU was 
forceful to the ruling government but in another issue they were 
moderate. For example, NU kept a distance from the government 
                                                 
79 Achmad Shiddiq, Khittah Nahdliyyah (Surabaya: LTNU dan Khalista, 2007), p. 66. 
80 Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama, p. 69. 
81 Ibid., p. 77. 
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during the New Order era, especially after the period of “going back to 
the 1926 khittah”. This attitude is called, by Nakamura, “radical 
traditionalism”.82 In detail, Nakamura asserts that the political attitude 
of NU actually is “accommodative”, but critical and autonomous.83 
Before Nakamura, Geertz84 addresses the attitude of kiai as 
cultural brokers, namely activities that relate to the broader socio-
political role of kiai in the community as spiritual guide, holder and 
controller of information, and determiner of a variety of local policies, 
including political issues. 
What has the pattern of the NU elites’ participation been like since 
the New Order age? Really, there have been two models of 
participation: “symbolic-pragmatic” and “symbolic- non-pragmatic”. 
Symbolically, the political participation of the NU elites is described 
with a participation model that only lies on symbol and cover. It does 
not touch upon the real participation, which is based on religious faith. 
`Ulama>’, kiai, and pesantren are used as symbols in carrying out political 
participation, particularly in founding a political party, and becoming 
an officer or member of a party. `Ulama>’ and kiai are symbols that are 
extremely close to spiritual and religious realms, so the involvement of 
kiai in politics is interpreted as the involvement of religion, or even the 
involvement of God in politics. From the political perspective, the NU 
elites can be regarded as symbols of God and religion in politics. 
Symbolic participation tends to be artificial, by placing “instant 
interest” rather than a truly political struggle as  the basis of politics, . 
It also tends to be “tenuous”, strongly sensitive to interest and even 
conflict. This tendency can be observed, for instance in the movement 
of the NU elites from one party to another because of differences in 
opinion or their aspirations not being accommodated. Likewise, they 
easily form new parties on behalf of `ulama>’, kiai, pesantren and even 
regard themselves as the only party that fights for Aswaja. 
On the other hand, pragmatic participation is based on well-
calculated politics, measuring benefit and loss and their socio-
                                                 
82 Mitsuo Nakamura, “Tradisioanalisme Radikal, Catatan Muktamar Semarang 1979,” 
in Fealy and Barton (eds), Tradisionalisme Radikal, pp. 72-75.  
83 Similar assertion is also stated by Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama’, p. 66; Muhtadi, 
Komunikasi Politik Nahdlatul Ulama, p. 145; and Feillard, NU vis a vis Negara, p. 76. 
84 Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese kijaji: the Changing Role of a Cultural Broker,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History: an international quarterly, 2, 2 (1960): pp. 228-59.  
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economic impacts. Pragmatic participation tends not to employ 
normative reasoning as a political platform. Instead, it relies largely on 
the fulfillment of instrumental matters and material gain. This model 
of participation is often followed by the NU elites in Madura, 
Pendalungan and some parts of the Arek area. In contrast, non-
pragmatic participation frequently occurs in the NU elites of 
Mataraman area and a part of pesisir (coastal) area. However, not all of 
the NU elites in Madura, Pendalungan and Arek are pragmatic, because 
some of them firmly embrace the traditional doctrines of `ulama>’ and 
NU, so that they maintain the Islamic values of religious personalities. 
Likewise, not all NU elites in Mataraman and pesisir (coastal) areas are 
non-pragmatic, because a variety of maneuvers are is also found that 
are frequently considered contradictory to the values of `ulama >’ and 
NU. 
Since the Reformation era, the opportunity of founding political 
parties has been well-utilized by Indonesians. As a result, any forms of 
political attitudes have been more tenuous and not dominated by a 
single political power. In this context, the NU elites have been more  
predisposed to get involved in politics because of their autonomous 
status. The transformation of political participation to “symbolic –
pragmatic” can be interpreted from the openness of the NU elites 
toward a political dynamic which is not “black and white” any more, 
but rather has a variety of colors. 
Conclusion 
Looking at geo-political and geo-cultural reality, the tendencies of 
political participation of the NU elites in East Java were prevalently 
heterogeneous. The NU kiais are in a position which is close to 
politics. It is normal for NU followers to consider the double roles of 
NU kiais; they are religious leaders dealing with spiritual aspects as well 
as community leaders involving themselves in social and potentially 
political aspects of life. However, this consideration occurs only 
locally, and cannot be implemented in the context of NU kiais 
nationally. The locality of political role is related to their social 
interaction with the culture in each area. Locality makes a contribution 
to understanding and perceiving politics; for instance, the Mataraman 
NU elites that tend to maintain a relationship with formal religious 
issues and there is a tendency to separate religion from politics. In 
contrast, Madura, Pendalungan, Pesisiran (north coast), and Arek areas 
tend to combine religion and politics. 
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In the island of Madura and the Pendalungan area, the closeness of 
religion and politics is obvious in the utilization of religious symbols in 
politics. For example, kiais who attend formal meetings always wear 
robes and turbans as arguably religious symbols. Likewise, kiais who 
are members of local parliament always wear religious attributes in 
formal ceremonies. Those cases rarely occur in Mataraman or Pesisir 
(coastal) areas, in which they have commenced to differ between 
religion and state formal agenda, except the wearing of the peci (hat) 
which has become a part of the national dress.  
In addition to the expansion above, there is another general 
characteristic that differentiates the NU elites of East Java from other 
Islamic elites (especially modernist Muslims). That aspect concerns the 
employment of principles of Islamic jurisprudence and legal theory in 
politics. There are different characteristics between these two Islamic 
groups because of a difference in social background. The modernist 
group, in general is highly driven by efforts to change the social reality 
of Muslims with regard to their religious practices. This religious 
experience finally is also applied to the change of political attitude. In 
contrast, the traditionalist group tries to coordinate, maintain and 
develop the faith, the religious culture that generally already exists. This 
attitude, in turn, has an impact on their view of social and political life. 
The argument that is commonly used is “al-muh}a>faz}ah `ala> al-qadi >m al-
s}a>lih} wa al-akhdh bi al-jadi >d al-as}lah}”. Accordingly, the first group tries to 
develop an ideal situation, while the second reflects social reality.   
The fiqh-oriented approach used by the NU elites in responding to 
political issues culminates in the implementation of fiqh principles. It 
then creates the accommodative and pragmatic tendency of the NU 
elites. Evolution of political behavior can be observed by looking at 
the intellectual tradition and decision making process developed by 
NU. Due to the fiqh-oriented political responses, political style of the 
NU elites is more flexible and accommodative which is proven to 
provide solutions to any political dilemma. [] 
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